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IV 
Respondent Kirk Jackson by and through his attorneys of record, Merrill and Merrill 
Chartered, states his Respondent's Brief as follows: 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Case 
This is a water rights case of first impression in which the Appellants Chad and Jane 
Barnes ("Barnses" herein) ask this Court to expand the forfeiture doctrine in a manner that has 
never been recognized by the Idaho Courts. Specifically, the Bamses asks this Court to find that 
when a predecessor property owner indisputably does not have enough water for the entire 
property, and chooses to use all of his available water for only a portion of his land, he thereby 
forfeits his water rights for subsequent purchasers of the un-watered portion of land upon 
partition of the tract. Such a decision would result in a finding that Respondent Kirk Jackson, 
("Jackson" herein), the subsequent purchaser for value of the p01iion the Bamses claim was 
unwatered, takes his parcel without any water rights whatsoever, and that the Barnses thereby 
obtained all the water rights that originally ran appurtenant to both parcels when they were 
unified. Barnes asks for this result even though it is undisputed that the predecessor owner of 
the two unified parcels , Craig Bloxham ("Bloxham" herein) "beneficially used his water right, 
all that was available to him, at all times in question." (R. 465, Decision on Motion for 
Reconsideration p. 9). Forfeiture of water rights is strongly disfavored under Idaho law. This 
Court has expressly stated that water rights cannot be forfeited by nonuse if the water was 
unavailable. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res. , 138 Idaho 831 , 843 , 70 P.3d 669,_ 
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(2003). In the "Monarch Decision," the Snake River Basin Adjudication recognized the 
Sagewillow defense to water forfeiture to be water unavailability. In Re SRBA Case No. 39576 
(lvfonarch Greenback, LLC), Dec. 9, 2009, pp. 14-15. The SRBA had held previously that " [i]n 
order for a water right to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the 
alleged period of nonuse." Wood v. Trout, SRBA subcase no. 65-05663B (May 9, 2002), 
( emphasis added). Because this Court has never measured forfeiture by examining how the 
water was applied to the land, and because this Court has never held that water rights could be 
forfeited when there was not enough water to fulfill the right, and because it is undisputed that 
the parent water rights on the unified parcel were always fully put to beneficial use, this Court 
should reject the Barnes' invitation to expand the forfeiture doctrine and affirm the District 
Court decision. 
Although the District Court did not reach this issue, because it found that there was no 
forfeiture at all, this Court may also affirm on the alternative grounds that the Idaho forfeiture 
statute was tolled while the property in question was in bankruptcy, from October 12, 2005 , until 
April 2012 when Jackson purchased the property from the bankruptcy trustee. (R 251-253, 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment). If this Court agrees, it must also grant summary judgment in favor of Jackson and 
against the Barnses, because the statutory period of forfeiture was not met on this record. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Barnses' claim on 
alternative grounds, because the evidence is undisputed that Jackson resumed partial use of the 
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water on his parcel in 2012, and he resumed full use of water on his parcel in April 2013 . The 
District Court found this evidence to be undisputed for purposes of summary judgment analysis. 
(R. 458, Decision on Motion to Reconsider p. 2, fn 5; R. 408 , Decision on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 9). The Barnses did not make a claim of right until they filed their lawsuit in 
August 2014. Even if this Court agrees that the water rights on Jackson's parcel were forfeited, 
Jackson's undisputed resumption of use before the Barnses made a claim of right leads to the 
same conclusion, and Barnes' claims must be dismissed. 
To avoid the resumption of use defense to dismiss their claim of forfeiture , the Barnses 
ask this Court to find that they may rely on the continued use of water rights by the predecessor 
owner of the entire parcel, Bloxham, to pre-empt Jackson's undisputed resumption of use 
argument. The Barnses ask this Court to treat Bloxham as a third party in interest asserting 
water rights on what subsequently became the Barnes ' parcel before Jackson resumed use on his 
parcel. This Court must reject this contention for the same reason that the District Court rejected 
it. The property was in bankruptcy from 2005 until Jackson purchased a part of the property in 
2012, and the Barnses purchased the remaining parcel in 2014. (R.184-186, Bloxham 
Banrkputcy Petition; R. 281-283 Trustee's Deed to Jackson; R.304-306; R. 310-314 Quitclaim 
Deed from Bloxham to his parents ; R. 315-317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses). Bloxham 
was always the legal title owner until the property was sold through the Bankruptcy Trustee to 
Jackson, and through Bloxham' s parents to Barnes. Bloxham was indisputably in continuous 
physical control of the property. (R 57-63 , Bloxham Affidavit). Bloxham himself testified that 
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he considered himself the owner of the parcels until they were sold. (R. 60, Bloxham Affidavit 
page 4, , 16). As the District Court found, Bloxham could not be a third party in interest to his 
own property. 
This argument is additionally illogical: The Bamses ask this Court to treat Bloxham as 
the senior water rights holder able to forfeit the water rights Jackson otherwise would have 
taken, and at the same time ask this Court to treat Bloxham as the junior water rights/third party 
based on the same conduct on the same property, thereby preventing Jackson from resuming use 
on the very same forfeiture. He is asking this Court to hold, through legal tap dancing, that 
Bloxham created the forfeiture because he owned the property to which the water right attached, 
and simultaneously prevented any resumption of use to defeat the forfeiture because he was a 
third party to the same forfeiture. The forfeiture rules are intended to protect junior water rights 
holder's expectations of "moving up in the queue" when senior water rights are not put to 
beneficial use for five years or more. They are intended to prevent waste or hoarding of water, 
or monopolization of water rights. See Peter R. Anderson and Aaron J. Kraft, Why does Idaho 's 
Water Law Regime Provide for Fo,feiture of Water Rights? 48 Idaho L. Rev. 419 (2012). They 
are not intended to permit a landowner at his sole discretion to concentrate his water rights into a 
single parcel when he partitions his property, presumably thereby increasing the prope1iy value 
of the parcel he retains. This Comi must reject a rule of law that would permit a property owner 
to forfeit water rights without any possibility of resumption of those rights by a derivative claim 
of equal priority, based on such legal gymnastics. 
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Taking these arguments together, the Bamses are asking this Court to craft a rule of 
forfeiture that would tum Idaho water rights law on its head. The Barnses are asking for a rule 
of law that would permit landholders to select parts of their land to concentrate their water rights 
through their water distribution, and to keep those full water rights on a smaller parcel than the 
original right provided simply by partitioning the land. Such a rule would encourage private 
land owners essentially to hoard and monopolize water rights to increase property values on 
smaller pieces of land, instead of using the water rights fully to benefit the lands to which they 
were originally assigned. Over time, this could restrict water rights allocation throughout the 
state of Idaho, as water rights become concentrated on smaller parcels, and selectively neglected 
parcels are left without any water rights. It could additionally permit the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources to take away water rights through forfeiture for farmers or ranchers who do not 
have enough water to fully utilize their acreage, and who must therefore make business decisions 
about how to best distribute and utilize the water they get. 
This rule of law advocated by the Barnses would require landowners to spread their water 
use proportionally to every inch of their land or risk losing their water rights, regardless of 
whether spreading their water this way puts it to the most efficient and beneficial use. This rule 
of law would make it extraordinarily difficult to negotiate fair market value of land having water 
rights, because it would require purchasers and lenders to try to determine whether the parcel 
they want to purchase has forfeited water rights before a partition through selective non-
watering, even though there is no record of such forfeiture , and evidence of forfeiture would not 
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always be apparent on visual inspection of the property. This has never been the law of Idaho . 
This Court must reject this invitation to change Idaho water rights law in a way that invites 
inequitable results and thwarts public policy. 
B. Prior Proceedings 
Jackson does not disagree substantially with Barnes' recitation and characterization of 
the Course of Proceedings, Appellant's Brief pages 2-5, with two exceptions: First, the District 
Court did not make any findings regarding whether Bloxham had ever watered the · Jackson 
parcel, 29-14032. (R. 485; Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 6). The facts are in 
dispute on this issue. (See Appellants' Brief page 7, footnote 4; Appellant's Brief page 8, citing 
R. at 168, 181-82). This dispute of fact was not material to the Judge's decision below, and it is 
not material to a determination on appeal. The District Court found, even assuming Bloxham's 
assertions to be true, (that he did not water the section of his land which subsequently became 
Jackson's parcel between the years 2004-2012), his conduct did not amount to forfeiture of any 
water rights on the entire parcel to which they were assigned as a matter of law. Jackson notes 
however, this dispute of material fact prevents an award of summary judgment in the Barnses ' 
favor, and it would make it very difficult for them to meet their evidentiary burden of proof of 
clear and convincing evidence of forfeiture if this case were remanded for trial. 
Second, although the District Court did not reverse its prior decision on reconsideration 
of summary judgment, the District Court did clarify its findings on beneficial use. ( R. 495-501, 
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration). The District Court additionally specifically addressed 
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and rejected the Barnes' claim that they could rely on Bloxham's assertion of water rights as a 
third party in interest. (R. 502-504, Decision on Motion to Reconsideration). 
C. Statement of Facts 
As a threshold matter, Respondent Kirk Jackson agrees and stipulates that the map 
provided in Appellant's Brief, Addendum A, page 2, is a true and accurate depiction of the 
current boundaries for the Water Rights Points of Use for both the Jackson (29-14032) and the 
Barnes' (29-14115) properties. Jackson includes in his brief as an Addendum pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35(g) the aerial maps depicting the original Bloxham Water Rights Points of Use 
for the property when it was unified (29-10420). These maps were relied on, in part, by the 
Barnses in creating Addendum A to Appellant's Brief. 
Craig Bloxham is one of the predecessor owners of a single parcel of property, with a 
single water right, Water Right 29-10420, located in the town Downey, Bannock County, Idaho. 
(R. 57-63, Bloxham affidavit). The other owner of the property was Eagle Eyes, Ltd., which it 
appears from the record was intended to be a holding company for the Bloxham family, although 
the record is unclear. (See R. 271-276, Exhibit 2, Wells Affidavit, Bankruptcy Motion to 
Approve Sale, p. 2, § 3). Bloxham and his parents, Vern and Delores Bloxham, obtained title to 
the property in 1992. (R. 271-276 ~ 3) Vern and Delores Bloxham subsequently conveyed their 
interest in the property to a trust, which subsequently conveyed the trust interest to Eagle Eyes, 
Ltd. (R. 271-276 ~ 3). It appears from the record that Bloxham never conveyed his interest in 
the property the Eagle Eyes, Ltd. Trust, (R. 271-276 ~ 3), and it appears that Bloxham did not at 
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least initially disclose his interest in the property to the bankruptcy court. (R. 184-186, Petition 
for Bankruptcy). 
On March 22, 2004, the SRBA Water Court issued a Partial Decree of Water Right 29-
10420, for owners Craig V. Bloxham and Vern Bloxham. (R 278-279, Partical Decree for Water 
Right 29-10420 Exh 3 Wells Affidavit). Water Right 29-10420 is diverted from a source known 
locally as Spring Creek. This Water Right permitted seasonal irrigation of 2 .24 CFS, and annual 
stockwater of .03 CFS. at the place of use. The Water Right 29-10420 referenced Water Right 
29-10419 with combined use limits, but the record below is unclear as to any relationship 
between the Bloxhams and the owners of Water Right 29-10419. Water Right 29-10420 states 
that "this right is limited to the irrigation of 112.0 acres within the place of use described above 
in a single irrigation season." The evidence is undisputed that Water Right 29-10420 is the 
parent water right for both the Jackson's Water Right 10432, and the Barnes' Water Right, 
14115 . (See R. 288-293, Proof of Water Right Exhibit 6, Wells Affidavit). 
Craig Bloxham filed for bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. The evidence is undisputed 
that Bloxham used and controlled the real property interests in this dispute throughout the period 
of bankruptcy, and until the property was sold by partition, first one parcel to Jackson in 2012, 
and then the second parcel to Barnes in 2014. (R.184-186, Bloxham Bankruptcy Petition; R. 
281 -283 Trustee's Deed to Jackson; R.304-306; R. 310-314 Quitclaim Deed from Bloxham to 
his parents; R. 315-317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses). The evidence is additionally 
undisputed that Bloxham held record title to the property, by operation of law, throughout the 
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bankruptcy. (R. 310-314 ). The evidence is undisputed that Bloxham considered himself the 
owner of the property during the period of bankruptcy. (R. 60, Bloxham Affidavit page 4, ~ 16). 
On April 26, 2012, Jackson purchased a portion of the property owned by Craig Bloxham 
from the bankruptcy trustee. (R. 281 -283 Trustee's Deed to Kirk Jackson) . Jackson purchased 
the property with the intent to living there, and planting a twenty acre orchard to be watered by 
Spring Creek. (R. 257-260, Jackson Aff. , ~ 8). Jackson believed when he purchased the property 
from the Bankruptcy Trustee that he was acquiring water rights inherited from the parent parcel 
of land, amounting to approximately forty percent of the water available for diversion from 
Spring Creek. (R. 259 Jackson Aff. ~ 28). Shortly after purchasing the property, Jackson 
approached Vern Bloxham requesting access to a diversion structure and pipeline he believed 
was owned by Vern, so that he could take his water out of the historical diversion point. Vern 
Bloxham told Jackson he would not permit that use. (R. 258, ~ ~ 4, 5). 
Jackson decided to avoid conflict with his neighbors, so he found another way to access 
his water rights. Jackson spent $2,000 to purchase an easement from another neighbor, so that 
he could construct a pipeline and diversion structure to get the water from Spring Creek to his 
property. (R. 258 , ~ ~ 6, 7) . In May or June 2012, Jackson planted over one hundred fruit trees 
on his property. Jackson began digging a pipeline for his irrigation system. Jackson worked 
with the Idaho Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS herein) to design a diversion 
system that would use forty percent of the water from Spring Creek. The NRCS shared costs for 
the portion of the system that would be used for stock water. (R. 258) . 
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On May 31 , 2012, Jackson filed his Notice of Change of Water Right Ownership with the 
Idaho Depaiiment of Water Resources (IDWR herein). (R. 213 Exhibit F attached to Affidavit of 
Robert Han-is). Water Right number 29-10420 was split into two Water Rights, 29-14031 and 
29-14032. Jackson obtained 29-14032, and Craig Bloxham retained 29-14031. (R. 288-293 , 
Proof of Water Right). 
While Jackson's diversion system was being installed, Jackson began using the water 
from Spring Creek to the best of his ability. From July to September, 2012, Jackson hauled 
water to his trees from Spring Creek with a 500 gallon water truck, four to five days a week. (R. 
165-168; Depo. Kirk Jackson p. 53-55). Beginning in April of 2013 and continuing through July 
of 2013 , Jackson pumped water from Spring Creek to his property to in-igate ten (10) acres of 
wheat he planted there. Jackson rented a pump to in-igate the wheat, and he continued to water 
his orchard. (R. 168-171 , Depo. Kirk Jackson p. 55-58), In the fall of 2014, Jackson used his 
water to in-igate his ground as part of his fall planting. (R 171-173, Depo. Kirk Jackson, p. 58-
60). 
Jackson testified, and his testimony was unrebutted, that the flow rate of Spring Creek 
was around 240 gallons per minute, and that it does not change substantially throughout the year. 
(R. 259, Jackson Affidavit,~ 16). Jackson testified about his experience and training in building 
and using weirs to measure water flow. (R. 259, Jackson Affidavit ~~ 17-21). Jackson testified, 
and his testimony was unrebutted, that his permitted water right, 29-114032, was for .840 cfs, 
which equates to 377.01 gallons per minute. (R. 279, Jackson Affidavit, ~~ 23-25). Jackson 
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testified that the flow rate of Spring Creek was insufficient to satisfy his full water right, which 
was approximately forty percent of the parent water right belonging to Craig Bloxham, 29-
10420. (R. 279, Jackson Affidavit, ~~ 23-24). Jackson testified, and his testimony was 
unrebutted, that he took all the available water out of Spring Creek to which he was entitled, 
forty percent of the water available from Spring Creek based on flow rate, and he put that water 
to beneficial use watering his trees and ten acres of a wheat crop, from April to July 2013. ( R. 
259, Jackson Affidavit ~ 25-27). In 2014, Jackson's pipeline and diversion structure was 
completed, and he used it to divert his forty percent of the Spring Creek water to irrigate his fall 
crop of wheat and sainfoin. (R. 259, Jackson Affidavit~~ 26, 27). 
Chad and Jane Barnes purchased their parcel from Vern and Delores Bloxham. (R. 315-
317 General Warranty Deed to Barnses). The Barnses applied to change the ownership of Water 
Right 29-14031 , which was still owned by Craig and Vern Bloxham. (R. 303, Notice of Change 
in Water Right Ownership, Exh. 9 Wells Affidavit) . IDWR split Water Right 29-14031 and 
created Water Right 29-14115 , the Barnes ' water right. Thus, Bloxham' s Water Right is still 29-
14031; Jackson ' s Water Right is 29-14032; and the Barnes ' Water Right is 14115. All three 
rights came from the parent right, 29-10420. (R. 308, Pedigree Search, Exh 10 Wells Affidavit) . 
In July 2015 , Craig Bloxham destroyed Kirk Jackson ' s headgate, curtailing Jackson' s 
ability to take his water. Bloxham was charged with and he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, Idaho 
Code § 18-14306. (R. 299-301). He was ordered to pay Jackson $3 ,534.14 for restitution. 
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Jackson testified that as of October 17, 2016, Bloxham had paid him only $70. (R. 260, Jackson 
Affidavit, ,i 36). 
The facts are undisputed that due to the Snake River Basin Adjudication tolling periods, 
any claim of forfeiture must be for conduct occurring in 2004 or beyond (and not considering 
other tolling periods such as the bankruptcy stay). (R. 355, Decision on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, fn. 14 & fn. 15) Craig Bloxham has testified that he did not water what subsequently 
became the Jackson property at all from 2004-2012. (R. 60, Bloxham affidavit ,i 16). This is the 
factual basis for his claim of forfeiture of the water rights for the Jackson' s Water Rights, 29-
14032. Jackson testified that he personally observed flood irrigation on the property shortly 
before he purchased it (R.156-162, Depo. Kirk Jackson pp. 26-49). Craig Bloxham testified that 
he "actively irrigated" the portion of his property that became the Barnses' parcel before and 
after he sold the Jackson parcel. (R. 61, Bloxham Affidavit ,i 20). This is the factual basis for his 
third- party claim ofright, to prevent Jackson's claim of resumption of use. Jackson disputes the 
Barnes' evidence that Bloxham actively irrigated what subsequently became their property after 
2012. Jackson testified that based on his personal observations, the parcel that subsequently 
became the Barnses' was "dry farmed" by Jackson's friend Dow Barker from 2012-2013, and 
that there were no apparent active attempts to irrigate the property until it was purchased by the 
Barnes in 2014. (R. 260. Jackson Affidavit ,i 29-35). The evidence is undisputed that there was 
not enough water in Spring Creek to irrigate Bloxham's entire property when it was unified, or 
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to fulfill the water rights he owned when the property was unified, 29-10420. (R. 117, Depa 
Kirk Jackson, p. 117, lines 13-19; R. 61 , Bloxham Affidavit~ 19). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Can a water right be forfeited solely on an un-watered section of property that is 
subsequently partitioned, where all the available water assigned to the parent 
water right was fully put to beneficial use? 
B. Did the fact of Bloxham' s bankruptcy and the automatic stay provisions of 
11.U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) toll the five-year statutory period required for forfeiture , so 
that the "clock" for forfeiture did not begin to run until the Jackson property was 
removed from bankruptcy? 
C. Can an owner and beneficial user of a water right simultaneously forfeit the water 
right as the parent holder of the water right, and also assert a third-party claim of 
right to prevent the resumption of use of that same derivative water right? 
D. Did the District Court err in denying the Bamses ' motion for summary judgment, 
and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Jacksons. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Jackson does not disagree with the Barnes ' assertion of the appropriate standard of 
review. Jackson would add that under the summary judgment standard of review, I.R.C.P. Rule 
56(a) , a District Court "may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party 
has not filed its own motion with the court." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 
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612, 617 (2001); See also Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 855, 
318 P.3d 622,624 (2014). 
In denying or granting summary judgment in a water rights forfeiture case, this Court 
must also consider the burden of proof required on the ultimate issue. Because water right 
forfeitures are disfavored under Idaho law, the paiiy asserting forfeiture must prove the 
forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 138 
Idaho 831,836, 70 P.3d 669,974 (2003) (Sagewillow JI). Additionally, although the owner of a 
water right must raise an affirmative defense to statutory forfeiture, the burden of persuasion 
remains ont eh party claiming forfeiture, to disprove the defense. Id. Clear and convincing 
evidence is generally understood to be "evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly 
probable or reasonably certain." In Re Delivery Call of A&B Irrigation Dist. , 153 Idaho 500, 
516,284 P.3d 225,241 (2012). 
If the paiiy asserting forfeiture cannot meet that burden of proof as a matter. of law, 
summary judgment is properly granted against that party. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THERE WAS NO FORFEITURE OF WATER RIGHTS, BECAUSE ALL 
WATER AVAILABLE TO THE PARENT PARCEL 29-10420 WAS PUT TO 
BENEFICIAL USE 
The legal elements of a water right in Idaho are: source, priority date, amount (either in 
annual volume or rate of flow, or both), period of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and 
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place of use. Olsen v. IDWR, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 (1983); Idaho Code§ 42-1411.11. The 
purpose of use element co1Telates with the Idaho Constitutional requirement that all water rights 
be put to "beneficial use." Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3 ( defining "beneficial uses" to include 
agricultural; domestic uses, manufacturing, mining and hydropower); See Jeffrey C. Fe1Teday et 
al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK, Givens Pursley LLP 2017, p. 22. 
http: //vvv.iw.Qivenspurslev.com/assets/publications/handbooks/handbook-waterlaw.pclf 
The Idaho legislature requires "[t]he appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial 
purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such purpose, 
the right ceases." Idaho Code § 42-104. "Beneficial use" for purpose of establishing or finding a 
water right has not been defined precisely by Idaho statute or case law, with some exception. 
Generally, in appropriating a water right, the State refers to very general or broad purposes of 
use, such as "irrigation," or "industrial," or "commercial." Id. at page 23. The concept of 
beneficial use itself arises from the general and well-grounded legal principle inherent in the 
appropriation doctrine: that in lands where water is scarce, water must not be wasted, and it 
must be put at all times to beneficial use. No one is entitled to more water than they can put to 
beneficial use at any given place or time. Id. at page 28, fn. 38. 
Although the Idaho Constitution defines certain uses of water in Idaho as "beneficial," 
Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3, prior decisions of this Court, and the former Snake River Basin 
Adjudication court, explain that these definitions are not exclusive. State of Idaho, Dep 't of 
Parks v. IDWR , 96 Idaho 440, 447, 530 P.2d 924, 931 (1974); In re SRBA, Case No. 395 76, 
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Idaho Dist. Ct. , Fifth Jud. Dist. (Basin-Wide Issue No. 00-91014, Amended Consent Decree, 
Feb. 25, 2009) ("Under Idaho law, any person may establish a diversionary water right, 
including to and from storage, for aesthetic, recreational or wildlife purposes"). 
The Idaho legislature has also defined some specific "beneficial uses" of water in Idaho. 
Idaho Code § 42-222 (municipalities holding water rights for anticipated future use is "beneficial 
use"); Idaho Code§§ 42-1501 to 42-1505 (certain instream uses are "beneficial uses"). 
These legal definitions of "beneficial use" in Idaho, the Idaho Constitution, Idaho case 
law, and Idaho statutes, refer to the way water is being used. None of these definitions refer to 
the separate element of a water right, place of use, as being intrinsically tied to or a requirement 
for dete1mining whether or not a particular use of water is beneficial. 
The "place of use" element of a water right refers to the requirement that a specific legal 
description be attached to the right, again with some specific statutory exceptions that do not 
apply to this case. It is a statutory requirement that the place of diversion where the water is 
being beneficially used is legally described. Idaho Code § 42-219. The place of use statutory 
definition in no way suggests that a determination of beneficial use is defined by the place of 
use . Rather, place of use is required to determine the land to which the right is appurtenant, and 
where the beneficial use will occur. 
In 2004, the Idaho legislature amended the Idaho Code to provide that "consumptive use" 
is no longer considered an element of a water right in Idaho. Consumptive use is defined as the 
actual volume of water consumed in the course of use or otherwise made unavailable to other 
Respondent's Brief 
11 406: Respondents.B ri ef Page 16 
users. Idaho Code § 42-202B(l). Changes in consumptive use within a water right do not 
require a transfer permit in Idaho. Effectively, this means that landowners are free to change 
their consumptive use within their place of use, and within their water rights generally, 
considering all the other elements. 
Jackson does not deny herein and did not deny below the case law Barnes has cited for 
the proposition that if water rights are not put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive 
years, those rights may be lost to statutory forfeiture. Idaho Code § 42-422; Gilbert v. Smith, 97 
Idaho 735, 552 P.2d 1220 (1976); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 
94 7 P.2d 400 (1997)(recognizing the concept of "partial forfeiture") . Forfeiture is the 
inexcusable failure to put full water rights to beneficial use. Id. 
In Hagerman, this Court noted that partial forfeiture should be recognized by Idaho, 
because otherwise a water user could hold the water against all subsequent appropriators by 
using only a part of the water. Hagerman, 94 7 P .2d at 408 ( emphasis added). "If a water user 
cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period, 
but must waste the water in order to divert the fidl amount of the water right, a forfeiture has 
taken place." Id. (emphasis added). This Court in Hagerman was clearly and correctly focused 
on the nonuse of water as the correct measure of partial forfeiture. Similarly, in Wood v. Troutt , 
SRBA subcase no . 65-05663B (May 9, 2002) the SRBA court stated, " [i]n order for a water right 
to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the alleged period of non-
use." 
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There is no case law in Idaho, and none can be found in other jurisdictions, and none is 
cited in Barnes' brief to this Court or to the District Court, to support the assertion that if a 
landowner does not have enough water to satisfy his entire water rights, but he fully puts the 
water he gets to beneficial use, he has nonetheless forfeited his water rights because he did not 
water his entire place of use. In a land of scarce water resources, and particularly during drought 
seasons as Southeastern Idaho has experienced in recent years, such a rule of law makes no 
sense. As this Court has stated: 
The water of this arid state is an important resource. Not only 
farmers, but industry and residential users depend on it. Because 
Idaho receives little annual precipitation, Idahoans must make the 
most efficient use of this limited resource. The policy of the law 
of this State is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least 
wasteful use, of its water resources. 
Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901,904, 792 P.2d 926,929 (1990). 
The forfeiture rule Barnes would have this Court adopt flies in the face of this long-
recognized water rights policy, because it ties the hands of Idaho water users by requiring them 
to spread all their water evenly among the entire acreage assigned as their place of use, 
regardless of whether this distribution of water secures maximum use and benefit of water 
resources. 
Jackson does not deny the law cited by Barnes that states that water users are not 
permitted to "waste" water. Idaho Code § 42-220 ; Hagerman, 130 Idaho at 735 , 947 P.2d at 
408. 
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It is a cardinal principle established by law and the adjudications of this court that 
the highest and greatest duty of water be required. The law allows the 
appropriator only the amount actually necessary for the useful or beneficial 
purpose to which he applies it. 
Munn v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198, 207, 252 P. 865 (1926). 
This is indisputably the law of Idaho. This rule of law, however, is not at all applicable 
to the facts of this case. There is absolutely no evidence on this record that Bloxham "wasted" 
water when the property and water right were unified in 29-10420, and Barnes does not 
reference any evidence of water waste on this record. See Appellant's Briefp. 19. The evidence 
is undisputed that there was not enough water to satisfy Bloxham's rights to water his entire 
place of use under the parent rights 29-10420. There is no evidence that Bloxham used more 
water than was required to meet his beneficial use. Bloxham's decisions of where to use the 
water within his place of use, which indisputably was not enough to satisfy his entire water right, 
does not amount to a forfeiture of his water rights. 
When water rights are first appropriated by the State, by necessity the State must 
consider the beneficial use to which the water will be put, and the number of irrigated acres that 
right will encompass. Idaho Code § 42-220. This of course is to help make sure that the water 
appropriated will be put to beneficial use, and water will not be wasted. It does not logically 
follow, however, that when there is not enough water in any given year, or for a number of years, 
a landowner will lose their water rights if they do not spread the water out in direct and precise 
proportion to that acreage. Water users in Idaho have the discretion and must have the discretion 
Respondent's Brief 
I 1406: Respondents.Brief Page 19 
to determine how and where they will use their water within their place of use, as is evidenced 
by the 2004 statutory elimination of the consumption of use element of a water right. If 
landowners do not use their entire water right allocated, or if they waste water, they may forfeit 
their rights under Idaho case law cited above. If, however, landowners must make hard choices 
about where and how to apply their water rights to beneficial use when water is scarce, and when 
the evidence is undisputed there was not enough water to irrigate the entire acreage assigned to 
their place of use, there is no logical or public policy reason to find statutory forfeiture. 
Barnes is correct in noting that water rights are appurtenant to the land, and a division of 
land divides appurtenant water rights in direct proportion. Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, 118 P. 
501 ( 1911 ). This rule of law is exactly why the Idaho Department of Water Resources assigned 
Jackson approximately forty percent of the water rights inherited from the parent water right -
because Jackson had purchased approximately forty percent of the original parcel that contained 
the parent water right. The water rights belonged to the entire parcel of land when it was 
unified. If Bloxham forfeited his rights , fully or partially, that forfeiture must also apply to the 
entire parcel that contained Water Right 29-10420. This becomes impossible to measure in the 
instant case, however, because a water right refers to beneficial use of the water, and not 
beneficial use of the land to which the water right is appurtenant. There is nothing at all in the 
legal definition of a water right by its elements, or in the legal definition of "beneficial use" in 
Idaho, that suggest otherwise. Bloxham fully used his water rights beneficially to irrigate his 
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land for crops within his place of use between the years 2004 and 2012. There was no forfeiture 
that can be measured. 
In their Motion to Reconsider filed in the District Court, the Bamses relied heavily on 
this Court's decision in Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992). In that case, this 
Court affirmed the underlying decision of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. The water 
right at issue covered three different fields, totaling ninety-six (96) acres. The third field was six 
(6) acres. Dobson objected to a transfer of water rights, arguing that approving the transfer 
would result in an enlargement because part of the water right had been forfeited for nonuse. 
The Director concluded that the consumptive use appurtenant to the six-acre field had been 
forfeited by nonuse, but the Director did not reduce the amount which had historically been 
diverted for the fields , concluding that the transfer would not change the amount of use 
authorized by the water right. The District Court concluded, and this Court agreed, that the 
Director's determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence. As this Court 
noted in Hagerman, 947 P.2d at 404, this Court's decision in the Dovel case was fact specific, 
and did not tum on any interpretation of forfeiture law. 
Dovel was decided before the Idaho legislature removed consumptive use of water as a 
consideration in determining whether a water right exists. Idaho Code § 42-202B(l). This is 
significant. If Dovel applies at all to this forfeiture analysis, the case now stands for the 
proposition that prior to 2004, lack of consumptive use on acreage could give rise to a forfeiture 
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claim made when those rights were being transferred. Since consumptive use can no longer be 
considered in determining whether a water right exists, Dovel really stands for the proposition 
that no forfeiture can occur today based on lack of consumptive use on only a portion of the 
property. 
Finally, it should be noted that water rights lost through forfeiture are supposed to revert 
to the state as unappropriated water. Jenkins v. State Dep 't of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 
647 P.2d 1256 (1982). As the Idaho Water Law Handbook explains: 
This does not mean that, say, a forfeited 1871-priority water right 
can be picked up and diverted under that priority by another water 
user. Rather, by eliminating this right from the priority line, more 
junior rights effectively "move up the ladder" or become that much 
more reliable because they have fewer senior rights in front of 
them. 
Ferreday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK, page 39. 
There are no policy arguments for the forfeiture rule that support Barnes ' interpretation. The 
reasons for the forteiture rule have been described as follows: 1) to "clear" the water rights 
queue; 2) to promote economic development as junior rights move up the queue; 3) conservation 
of resources; 4) incentivizing participation in desirable water use practices, such as water 
banking. See Anderson & Kraft, Why Does Idaho 's Water Law Regime Provide for Forfeiture of 
Water Rights, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 419, 440-446 (2012). Under the Barnes' view of this case, 
Bloxham had the right to concentrate his water rights onto one part of his place of use by 
changing his consumptive use, and then partition the un-watered portion of his place of use, but 
Respondent's Brief 
11406: Respondents.Brief Page 22 
still keep the "forfeited" water as a "third party in interest" or junior water rights holder to his 
own water right. No one benefits from this interpretation of Idaho water law except for 
Bloxham, and his successor in interest, the Barnses, as their property values are enhanced by 
more concentrated water rights on a smaller acreage than was originally appropriated, at the 
expense of Jackson' s property which is devalued due to the loss of water rights. 
B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
BANKRUPTCY CODE TOLLED THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF 
FORFEITURE, AND THE CLOCK DID NOT RUN ON FORFEITURE 
WHILE THE JACKSON PROPERTY WAS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Although the District Court did not decide the case on this issue, this Court can affirm the 
granting of summary judgment in favor of Jackson on the alternative grounds raised below, 
because there is no dispute of material facts on this issue. When a debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition, an automatic stay immediately arises . 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The stay provisions, 11 
U.S.C. § 362(3), prohibit "any act to obtain possession of property of the state or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(l) 
provides that property continues to be protected by the state so long as the property remains in 
the bankruptcy estate. The stay " is designed to effect an immediate freeze of the status quo by 
precluding and nullifying post-petition actions, judicial or non-judicial , in nonbamkuptcy forums 
against .. . or affecting the property of the estate." In Re Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d 581 , 585 (91h 
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Cir. 1993). "Accordingly, section 362 is extremely broad in scope and should apply to almost 
any type of formal or informal action against. .. the property of the estate." Delpit v. 
Commissioner, 18 F.3d 768, 771 (91h Cir. 1994). 
The Barnses object to this Court allowing the bankruptcy stay to toll the forfeiture 
statutory period, stating that tolling of a statute is not an "act" that can be stayed by the federal 
statutes. The Barnses mischaracterize the application of the stay provisions. It is not the Idaho 
statute that is being stayed by federal bankruptcy law; it is Bloxham's actions of alleged 
forfeiture that are being stayed. While the property was in bankruptcy, Bloxham was not entitled 
to take any actions that could affect the property value or disposition. This includes, by the 
Barnses' theory, choosing to water or not to water the property that would subsequently become 
the Jackson's property. Any actions or willful inactions Bloxham took while the property was in 
bankruptcy should not be counted under Idaho's foreclosure statute under these federal 
bankruptcy provisions. 
The Bamses next object that because the bankruptcy code contains its own tolling statute, 
11.U.S.C. § 108(b), the federal tolling statute controls. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) is inapplicable. That 
tolling statute applies to nonbankruptcy laws that fix a time for a debtor to cure a default or "any 
other similar act." Forfeiture of water rights is not curing default or a similar act. 
Next, the Barnses object that the bankruptcy code excepts the automatic state from 
barring the "commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental 
unit .. . to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or regulatory power." 11 
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U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). This statute does not on its face apply to this forfeiture proceeding, which 
was not brought by any governmental unit. It was brought by private parties, the Barnses. 
As noted by the District Court, Bloxham was still the property title owner throughout the 
pendency of the bankruptcy, and he was also by operation of law the holder of the appurtenant 
water right. Bloxham was stayed from taking any action that could affect the property during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy, which would include deciding whether to water any part of his land. 
Idaho's forfeiture statutory period was tolled by operation of bankruptcy law. This Court can 
affirm the dismissal of Barnses' case and affirm the award of summary judgment to Jackson on 
this basis. 
Finally, the Barnses complaint that application of the automatic stay provisions of the 
bankruptcy code would "enlarge or create" substantive property rights as defined by state law. 
Appellant's Brief, page 28. Applying the bankruptcy stay to toll the Idaho forfeiture statute does 
not enlarge or create substantive property rights. It prevents the property values from being 
manipulated through non-use of water rights or concentrated use of water rights to · cause a 
forfeiture of valuable property rights. This is the very reason for the bankruptcy code stay: to 
prevent the judgement debtor or anyone else from taking action that could affect the value of 
property to be distributed in bankruptcy. 
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C. THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED THAT JACKSON RESUMED FULL USE 
OF HIS WATER RIGHT BY APRIL OF 2013 
The District Court found there was no dispute that Jackson partially resumed the water 
use on his property in 2012, and that he fully resumed the water use on his property in 2013. 
The Barnses attempt to create a material dispute of fact on this issue when none exists. The 
District Court found there was no dispute on this issue. Jackson testified that he diverted forty 
percent of the available water from Spring Creek and he pumped that water to irrigate his 
orchard and other crops. Although Bloxham and another neighbor testified they did not "see" 
Jackson irrigating his property, there was no testimony offered to contradict Jackson's diversion 
and beneficial use testimony. It should be noted that given Bloxham's open hostility to the 
Jackson's water rights from the beginning, his credibility is questionable. Jackson has 
additionally explained that his neighbor Henderson' s view of the Jackson property is obstructed 
by a berm, and he would not know whether Jackson was irrigating his property. 
On appeal , the Bamses ask this Court to speculate from the volume of water they are 
estimating was diverted that this did not represent forty percent of the available water from 
Spring Creek. Appellant's Brief p. 39. In support the Bamses reference an interrogatory 
response that succinctly summarizes Jackson' s water use in 2013 , but ignores the fuller 
deposition and affidavit testimony that full y explained it. (R. ) This is not a material fact in 
dispute. 
Respondent's Brief 
11406: Respondents. Brief Page 26 
D. AS THE HOLDER OF THE PARENT WATER RIGHT, BLOXHAM COULD 
NOT BE BOTH THE "OWNER" OF THE PROPERTY ABLE TO 
PARTIALLY FORFEIT WATER RIGHTS ON HIS PROPERTY, AND 
SIMULTANEOUSLY BE THE THIRD PARTY IN INTEREST/JUNIOR 
WATER RIGHTS HOLDER ABLE TO PREVENT RESUMPTION OF 
WATER RIGHTS WHEN HE PARTITIONED THE SAME PROPERTY 
Bloxham relies on Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 
70 P.3d 669 (2003) ("Sagewillow JI) to assert that he was a third party in interest using the water 
that he had forfeited by not watering what subsequently became the Jackson property. Bloxham 
claims that he was both the owner to the entire parcel able to forfeit the water right, and that by 
the same conduct of using that "forfeited" water on what subsequently became the Barnes ' 
property, when he partitioned his own property for sale through bankruptcy, he became a third 
pm1y to his own forfeiture. This circular logic makes no sense, and it is not supported by any 
previous holdings of this Court. 
In Sagewillavv JI, this Court recognized a possibility that junior water rights holders who 
begin using water when senior rights are forfeited could prevent a resumption of use argument 
and preserve the forfeiture . In that case, a landowner applied to the Department to change the 
place of use of numerous ground and surface water rights that originally had been authorized for 
irrigation of up to 2,390 acres in the Little Lost River Basin. Two of the ground water rights 
appurtenant to approximately 640 acres had been appropriated in the 1960s to facilitate obtaining 
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federal desert land entry ("DLE") patents, and thereafter had been abandoned. Between the late 
1960s and 1989, no more than 1,412 acres had ever been irrigated under the remaining rights by 
Sagewillow's predecessor in interest. In 1989, Sagewillow purchased the property and 
immediately began redeveloping the irrigation system. By 1994, Sagewillow had brought 
approximately 2,390 acres back under irrigation, and then sought to change the place of use of 
the rights to reflect how they were then being used. The Department held that the two ground 
water rights appurtenant to 640 DLE acres had been forfeited in their entirety and · that the 
portions of the remaining rights appurtenant to anything more than 1,412 acres also had been 
forfeited. The Department approved the transfer on condition that Sagewillow could irrigate no 
more than 1,412 acres. On appeal , the primary issue was whether Sagewillow had lawfully 
resumed the water rights and thereby avoided forfeiture. 
This Court held that common law resumption remains a valid defense to forfeiture that 
can be defeated by a showing that a third party has made a "claim of right" to the water prior to 
the senior's resumption of use. A third party has made a claim ofright to the water if he has: 1) 
instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture ; 2) obtained a valid water right authorizing the use 
of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption; or 3) used the water pursuant to an 
existing right. This Court also held that the resumption need not be made by the original 
appropriator, but must be upon the lands to which the water right originally was appurtenant. 
This Court additionally held that resuming the use of only a portion of the forfeited or 
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abandoned right will not prevent a loss of the non-resumed portion. Sagewillow II, 138 Idaho at 
842, 70 P.3d at 680. 
This Court remanded the case to the Department for further proceedings, to determine if 
there were any junior water rights holders who were relying on the forfeited water rights and 
could be affected by Sagewillow's application. Id. 
This Court has held that only property owners, and not the beneficial users, of water 
rights are able to forfeit those water rights through nonuse. Aberdeen Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 87,982 P.2d 917 (1999). The Peiper rule has been broadened and codified by 
Idaho Code § 42-223(7), but the common law rule has not been changed legislatively. 
In the instant case, Bloxham urges this Court to treat him as the owner of the water right 
able to forfeit the right under the Peiper rule, but to also treat him as a junior water right holder 
in relationship to Jackson under the Sagewillow II rule, so that he could prevent Jackson's 
resumption of use. He asked to be treated by the law as two different parties to the same 
transaction, even though it is the very same conduct he is alleging that created both the 
forfeiture, and which should also prevent the resumption of use: Bloxham chose not to water the 
part of his parcel that became the Jackson parcel, and he chose to use all of his water on the part 
of his parcel that became the Barnses' property. Bloxham believes that he "automatically" 
became a third party in interest to the entire forfeiture as soon as he became severed from the 
Jackson property when he transferred that parcel to the bankruptcy court for sale. This argument 
misreads the entire reason for the Sagewillow II rule of law. The Sagewillow 11 rule is intended 
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to protect junior water rights users who have begun using the water previously forfeited by 
senior water rights users. This is consistent with the idea that when senior water rights are 
forfeited, they revert to the State so they can be re-appropriated to junior users for beneficial use. 
Jenkins v. State Dep'tofWater Resources, 103 Idaho 384,647 P.2d 1256 (1982). 
Bloxham was not a junior water rights user to Jackson, and he was not a senior water 
rights user to Jackson. His water rights were identical in priority at all times to Jackson, because 
Jackson's water rights derived from Bloxham' s. The priority date for all three of the rights in 
question, 29-10420 (the parent right), 29-14032 (Jackson's right), and 29-14115 (Bamses' right), 
was March 22, 2004. (R. 288-293; 308). Bloxham was not a junior water rights holder who 
could protect his water use based on forfeiture under Sagewillow II. Sage·willow 11 is inapposite. 
The Barnses cannot use their predecessor in interest's reliance on an alleged water rights 
forfeiture of his own water right to prevent resumption of use by an equal successor of that same 
water right. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF JACKSON 
The District Court properly denied summary judgment for the Barnses and granted 
summaiy judgment for Jackson. There are no material facts in dispute on the issues decided by 
the District Court. There are disputes of fact related to whether Bloxham irrigated the property 
that became the Barnes' and to what extent he irrigated that property. There are disputes of fact 
related to whether Bloxham irrigated the property that became the Jackson's. These disputes of 
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fact do not prevent the granting of summary judgment, however, because even assuming the 
facts as the Barnses have stated, for all the reasons set forth above, their arguments fail as a 
matter of law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in Jackson's favor. 
This Court should affirm the findings that there was no forfeiture on Bloxham's unified parcel, 
regardless of where he put his water to beneficial use, because the evidence is undisputed there 
was not enough water to satisfy his full water right for the place of use. Idaho law and rulings of 
the SRBA consistently hold it is use of the water, and not use of the land, which control the 
forfeiture analysis . 
This Court can affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that while the property was in bankruptcy, Bloxham could not take any act to forfeit the 
water rights on that property because of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code, 
which are intended to protect the value of assets in bankruptcy. The Barnses have offered no 
legitimate argument to the contrary. 
Even if this Court found a forfeiture occurred, because Jackson fully resumed water use on 
his property consistent with his water right in April 2013, and because the Barnses did not file 
their forfeiture action until August 2014, their action must be dismissed. There is no genuine 
dispute of material fact on this issue. 
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This Court must reject the Barnses ' attempt to conflate their predecessor in interests ' roles in 
the alleged forfeiture of water rights, to permit a rule where the owner of a water right can 
simultaneously forfeit that right and rely on that forfeiture as a "junior user" to their own water 
right. Such a rule of law is illogical, and it does not advance any legitimate water rights law 
policy. This Court must reject the legal gymnastics Barnes is asking this Court to engage in, 
because it is not consistent with the larger policy concerns of Idaho water rights law. 
Landowners should not be permitted unilaterally to concentrate their water rights on smaller 
acreage than was appropriated in order to increase property values, or for any other reason. They 
should not be permitted to foreclose the opportunity for resumption of use of the alleged 
forfeiture of water simply by portioning their un-watered land. Landowners should be permitted 
to make decisions within their points of use regarding the most efficient and beneficial use of 
their water when there is insufficient water to satisfy their rights. For all the reasons previously 
discussed, the rule of law advocated by the Barnes would lead to illogical results inconsistent 
with the broader policies of Idaho water rights law, of preserving water rights for beneficial use 
on the land to which it was appropriated. 
The District Court correctly recognized the logical flaws of the Barnses ' legal analysis, and 
the logical inconsistency of their arguments, and the inconsistency with established water rights 
law in Idaho. This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Barnses ' claims on summary 
judgment. 
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Dated this 251h day of July, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby ce1iify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with 
all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served .on each 
party at the following email addresses: 
Dated and certified this 25 1h day of July, 2017. 
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Respondent ' s Brief were served by email and mailed, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Robert E. Harris 
D. Andrew Rawlings 
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Dated and certified this 25th day of July, 2017. 
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ADDENDUM 
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g), Jackson submits the following maps which 
depict the place of use of Water Right 29-10420 in 2004, 2006, and 2009 (R. at 267-269). 
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